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Introduction
Constitutional and prudential standing doctrines have received an
abundance of scholarly consideration.  Statutory standing, in contrast, has
remained largely unexplored.  The Supreme Court’s use of the term is
relatively consistent and unobjectionable, but the meaning that many lower
courts ascribe to it is anything but innocuous.  This article develops a
conceptual framework for understanding the different ways in which different
courts conceive of statutory standing, and it uses the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) as a paradigmatic example to illustrate
the pernicious effects that result from common misconceptions of statutory
standing.  
According to the Supreme Court, “the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
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1. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see also, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 750-51 (1984).  It is well-settled that constitutional and prudential standing inquiries are
separate from the merits of a dispute, but a seminal 1988 law review article by now-Judge
William A. Fletcher persuasively argued that such a distinction is artificial.  William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988).  Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has never agreed.  However, one contention of this article is that there is room for courts
to acknowledge that statutory standing is nothing more than an element of the cause of action.
2. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982); Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
3. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 162 (1997).
4. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; see also, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
5. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162; see also, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992).
6. Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases” that fall within
certain enumerated categories, as well as “Controversies” that fall within six other categories.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
7. Compare John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1004 (2002) (“[N]o one
seriously believes that the Framers chose [the words ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’] with anything
like the Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework in mind or that the Court’s justiciability rulings
are anything other than a judicially invented gloss on the Constitution.”), and Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV.
163, 166 (1992) (arguing that existing standing doctrine is a recent “invention” of federal
judges), with Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine, 102
MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004) (arguing that although “history [does not] compel[ ] acceptance
of the modern Supreme Court’s vision of standing  [, it also] does not defeat standing doctrine;
the notion of standing is not an innovation, and its constitutionalization does not contradict a
settled historical consensus about the Constitution’s meaning”) (emphasis added).
particular issues.”   The process of answering this question implicates both1
“constitutional limitations” on federal jurisdiction and “prudential limitations
on its exercise.”   These limitations are “founded [o]n concern about the2
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”3
Constitutional standing requires that a plaintiff “allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.”   There are three well-established4
requirements of constitutional standing: the plaintiff must prove that she has
suffered or imminently will suffer an “injury in fact,” that the injury is “fairly
traceable” to the conduct of the defendant(s), and that a favorable judicial
outcome is likely to redress the plaintiff’s injury.   The legitimacy of this5
doctrine—which is based on the Court’s interpretation of the “Cases” and
“Controversies” language in Article III of the Constitution —is the subject of6
considerable academic debate.7
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8. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
9. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
10. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“Standing doctrine embraces several
judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general
prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of
generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law
invoked.”).
11. Maxwell L. Stearns, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Environmental
Standing, 11 DUKE ENV. L. & POL. FOR. 321, 323 n.8 (2001) (“Constitutional and prudential
standing rules come into play in virtually all standing cases, regardless of whether the cause of
action arises under the Constitution or a statute.”).
12. The zone of interests test has strong connections to statutory standing, see infra Part
I.B.2, but the Supreme Court has applied the zone of interests test to a non-statutory cause of
action.  Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).  There is good reason
to believe this decision was anomalous, such that the zone of interests test is best viewed as
applying only to statutorily-created causes of action.  In any event, despite the connection
between the zone of interests test and statutory standing generally, the concept of statutory
standing does not appear outside of the context of statutorily-created causes of action.
13. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 92, 97, n.2 (1998)
(identifying the question of statutory standing as “whether this plaintiff has a cause of action
under the statute”).
14. The phenomenon described in this article is yet another illustration of what Justice
Kennedy recently described as the “tyranny of labels.”  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35,
In addition to the “irreducible constitutional minimum”  of standing, the8
Supreme Court has articulated a series of “rule[s] of self-restraint.”   These9
judicially-created rules are referred to as the prudential standing limits, and
they include: the bar against third party standing, the prohibition on
generalized grievances, and the zone of interests test.   As with constitutional10
standing, some scholars challenge the propriety and need for these prudential
standing limits.  Academic criticisms notwithstanding, doctrines of
constitutional and prudential standing appear to be here to stay, and they place
generally applicable limits on the ability of litigants to pursue claims in federal
court.11
This article addresses one particular aspect of standing that, to date, has
received surprisingly little considered attention.  It is often referred to by
courts and commentators as “statutory standing.”  Unlike the generally
applicable principles of constitutional standing and the other principles of
prudential standing, the concept of statutory standing applies only to
legislatively-created causes of action.   Broadly speaking, it asks whether a12
statute creating a private right of action authorizes a particular plaintiff to avail
herself of that right of action.   The central thesis of this article is that the13
meaning regularly ascribed to the term statutory standing by lower courts can
and does lead to pernicious consequences.14
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Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665), available at http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-665.pdf.
Part I develops a conceptual framework for understanding the ways in
which courts conceive of “statutory standing.”  In Part I.A, I identify one
common and legitimate use of the term—as a descriptive label of the fact that
the plaintiff in a particular lawsuit is the kind of person to whom Congress
intended to allow recovery under the statutory cause of action.  Part I.A also
explains that the term statutory standing may be used to describe the legal rule
that a plaintiff cannot recover under a statutory cause of action unless he or she
is the kind of person to whom Congress intended to allow recovery.  These
two uses of the term stem from the same basic conception of statutory
standing—that it has the same status as any other element of the cause of
action.  Unfortunately, even these uses of the term give the impression that one
particular statutorily-imposed requirement—whether the plaintiff is within the
class of persons to whom Congress has granted a private right of
action—should be distinguished from all others.  Nonetheless, Part I.B
explains that both of these uses of the term—and the conception of statutory
standing that lies beneath those two uses—find support in the scholarly
literature and case law.
Part II identifies yet another conception of the term statutory standing: as
shorthand for the legal rule that the court must conduct a threshold inquiry
(which may be jurisdictional) into the question of whether the plaintiff is
within the class of persons for whom Congress intended to allow recovery
under a statutory cause of action.  This legal rule is different from the legal
rule described in Part I, because it elevates the question of whether the plaintiff
falls within the class of persons to whom Congress has granted the private
right of action to an inquiry that must be conducted at the outset of the case,
separate from the “merits,” and possibly also as a jurisdictional imperative of
the case.  In contrast, the legal rule described in Part I conceives of statutory
standing as merely one element of the cause of action, such that failure to
“satisfy” the statutory standing “requirement” is no more or less important
than failure to satisfy any other prerequisite to recovery.  Unfortunately, it is
the former, rather than the latter, conception that lower courts have embraced.
That is, lower federal courts have widely accepted the idea that statutory
standing is a threshold inquiry, and indeed most courts consider statutory
standing to be jurisdictional.  Part II examines the perverse effects of the
application of this conception by using one important and paradigmatic
example: statutory claims brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  Part II.A provides some necessary
background regarding ERISA and its civil enforcement provisions.  Part II.B
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss1/3
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15. The OYEZ Project is available at http://www.oyez.org.  It is maintained by Professor
Jerry Goldman.  See Northwestern University Department of Political Science Website,
Biography of Professor Jeremy Goldman, http://www.polisci.northwestern.edu/people/gold
man.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).  The United States Supreme Court lists the OYEZ Project
as an unofficial source of information about the Court.  See Where to Obtain Supreme Court
Opinions 4 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/obtainopinions.
pdf.
16. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006); Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v.
First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997);
United Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Group Inc., 517 U.S. 544 (1996); Director,
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S.
122 (1995); Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992); Gollust v. Mendell, 501
U.S. 115 (1991); Air Courier Conference v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991);
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990); Jackson Transit Auth. v. Transit Union, 457
U.S. 15 (1982); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v.
Vill. Of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973);
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co.,
406 U.S. 416 (1972); Gutknecht v. United States, 369 U.S. 295 (1970); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); Fed.
Trade Comm’n  v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. United
States, 364 U.S. 1 (1960); United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); see The
OYEZ Project, Search Results - Statutory Standing, http://www.oyez.org/search/apachesolr_
search/%22statutory%20 standing%22 (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).  For a complete list of all
terms “tagged” in the database, see The OYEZ Project, Tags, http://www.oyez.org/tagadelic/
chunk/2 (last visited Aug. 26, 2009).  Until March  2009, the OYEZ Project included a
subcategory on its list of case issues entitled “Judicial Power: Statutory Standing,” which
included fourteen of the twenty-one Supreme Court opinions listed above.  Id.  This
subcategory, previously available at The OYEZ Project, Cases - Judicial Power, Standing to
Sue, http://www.oyez.org/issues/ judicial-power/statutory-standing/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2009),
now redirects users to the broader category of “standing to sue” cases.
demonstrates the effects of senselessly elevating the question of “statutory
standing” to a special status.  Finally, Part II.C, argues that the label of
“statutory standing” can and often does obfuscate the essential inquiry of
whether the plaintiff before the court is within the class of persons to whom
Congress has granted a private right of action.
I. Confronting Statutory Standing
The OYEZ Project, a comprehensive relational database of information
about the United States Supreme Court,  has associated twenty-one decided15
cases with the label of “statutory standing.”   A cursory examination of these16
cases, however, reveals few similarities.  This compels several questions.
What does it mean to describe litigation as involving concerns about statutory
standing?  Is there an established statutory standing doctrine that imposes
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
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17. For example, in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, the majority described the issue as whether the plaintiff was “a person
injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton
Act,” 549 U.S. 519, 546 (1983), whereas the dissent characterized the same issue as one of
“standing to sue under § 4,” id. at 547 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  See generally John G. Roberts,
Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219 (1993).
18. E.g., Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 175 (2000); see also,
e.g., Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 113 n.25 (framing question of whether § 812 of the Fair
Housing Act conferred a private right of action on testers as a question of “standing to sue under
§ 812”); Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 n.8 (holding that § 810 of the Fair Housing Act conferred
standing to sue on existing tenants, but declining to consider “the question of standing to sue
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982”).
requirements on the federal judiciary?  If so, what are the contours of that
doctrine?  This Part addresses these questions.
A. Defining Statutory Standing
The adjudication of any cause of action requires that certain questions be
answered in the affirmative before a plaintiff is permitted to recover.  For a
cause of action created by statute, one such question is whether the plaintiff
falls within the class of people to whom the legislature has granted a private
right of action.  Courts and commentators sometimes use the phrase “statutory
standing” to describe this question or to describe the conclusion that the
question has been answered in the affirmative.   Put another way, the term17
“statutory standing” often functions merely as a descriptive label of a fact—the
fact that the plaintiff falls within the class of people to whom Congress has
granted a private right of action.  For example, if a federal statute contains a
provision allowing “any person” to bring a civil suit against an alleged violator
of the statute, then a court or scholar might describe the statute as conferring
statutory standing on all citizens to sue for violations of the statute.  If the
existence of the fact is in doubt, then there is a question as to whether there
“is” statutory standing.
Relatedly, the term “statutory standing” is used to describe the legal rule
that a plaintiff cannot recover unless he or she falls within the class of persons
to whom Congress has granted the private right of action.  That is, the term
statutory standing is often used as shorthand for the requirement that the
statutory standing question must be answered in the affirmative before the
plaintiff can recover.   This is not a terribly complicated rule, and if statutory18
standing is viewed in this way, then it is one of many prerequisites to recovery
that may require adjudication in litigation involving a statutorily-created cause
of action.  For example, a plaintiff asserting a statutory claim will often need
to establish that (i) the defendant(s) engaged in conduct prohibited by the
statute; (ii) the defendant(s)’ conduct is governed by the statute (i.e., the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss1/3
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19. Of course, some shorthand labels do exist.  The obvious example from the list above
is administrative exhaustion—a universally understood label for a certain type of procedural
requirement for recovery.  Another example appears in litigation governed by ERISA, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006)).  Whether a particular
defendant—and, more specifically, the defendant’s conduct—is subject to certain requirements
of ERISA is often referred to as a question of “fiduciary status.”  See generally Dana Muir,
Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 424-32 (2000).  Unlike the phrase “statutory standing,” however,
shorthand labels such as “administrative exhaustion” are both universally understood and
consistently used.  And shorthand labels such as “fiduciary status” are unique to discrete
substantive areas of the law.  These distinctions are quite significant.  As explained in Part II,
infra, the general applicability of standing as a concept often results in the reflexive importation
of elements from unrelated standing doctrines.  See, e.g., Crawford v. Lamantia, 34 F.3d 28 (1st
Cir. 1994) (holding that statutory standing must exist throughout the litigation).
20. E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“It is firmly
established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does
not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.”). 
21. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
defendant is not exempt); (iii) the remedy sought is available under the statute,
and (iv) all relevant procedural requirements imposed by the statute have been
satisfied.  
Other than statutory standing, however, these prerequisites to recovery are
not typically given their own label.   Indeed, courts and commentators often19
go to great lengths to describe all questions about such prerequisites as
involving the “merits” of a particular claim.   It is, therefore, curious that one20
prerequisite—that the plaintiff fall within the class of people to whom
Congress granted a private right of action—is regularly given its own label.
The phrase “statutory standing” is particularly curious because of the
generally accepted meaning of the term “standing.”  The Supreme Court has
defined standing as “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the
merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”   This appears to suggest that21
statutory standing is unlike other statutory prerequisites to recovery in that its
existence is somehow different from questions involving “the merits of the
dispute or of particular issues.”  That is, perhaps the term statutory standing is
more than a descriptive label for a fact, and perhaps it is more than a label for
the familiar and straightforward requirement that a plaintiff must satisfy all of
the elements of the cause of action in order to recover.  As described in Part
I.B, however, common uses of the term do not support such a view.  To the
contrary, the most plausible understanding of statutory standing is that it serves
as nothing more than a shorthand for the principles already described.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
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22. Stearns, supra note 11, at 327. 
23. Now-Chief Justice Roberts’ article entitled “Article III Limits on Statutory Standing”
focused entirely on the doctrine of constitutional standing.  Roberts, supra note 17, at 1219
(defending Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), as “a sound and straightforward
decision applying the Article III injury requirement”).
24. That is, whether Congress is permitted to grant a private right of action to a particular
individual will be limited by the individual’s ability to satisfy the constitutional standing
requirements.  Of course, many excellent papers have been written about this issue.  See, e.g.,
William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247,
B. Unearthing a Statutory Standing Doctrine
If statutory standing is somehow different from other legislatively-imposed
requirements, it seems natural to ask “Why?” and “In what respects?”
Surprisingly, these questions have attracted little, if any, scholarly attention.
This section begins to explore the question of whether statutory standing is
more than a term that describes the existence of a particular fact or a familiar
legal requirement.  An examination of the relevant literature and case law
demonstrates, however, that the term should be understood as no more than
either a description of a fact or an articulation of the requirement that a
plaintiff, in order to recover, must fall within the class of persons to whom
Congress has granted a statutorily-created cause of action.
1. Limits on Legislative Authority
Many important judicial opinions described as “statutory standing cases”
involve whether—and to what extent—Congress has exceeded its authority in
broadly granting and framing a private right of action in a particular statute.
For example, in the words of one noted standing expert:
While the Supreme Court has addressed statutory standing in other
contexts, the most recent skirmishes over statutory standing have
been fought on the environmental battleground. . . .  Among the
major questions that [these] cases present is the power of Congress
to confer standing on all persons to redress violations of federal
environmental law, even when the claimants have suffered no
injury distinct from the harm to the public at large as a result of
those violations.22
Although these “citizen standing” cases are often referred to as presenting
questions of “statutory standing,” it is important to understand that the debate
in such cases is over the propriety of the “statutory standing” granted by
Congress.   And the propriety of Congress’s action turns on one’s conception23
of constitutional standing principles.   In this context, the term “statutory24
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss1/3
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251 (2000) (arguing that “courts should show deference to the legislature in evaluating the
existence of injury in fact, traceability, and redressability”); William A. Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988) (arguing that the only constitutional standing requirement
should be a cause of action).
25. Of course, this does illustrate one way in which statutory standing is different from
other legislatively imposed requirements (i.e., it is subject to the limits of Article III).  But every
federal legislative enactment is subject to some constitutional limit.  More importantly, the fact
that Congress’s ability to confer statutory standing is subject to the limits of Article III hardly
justifies the negative consequences that have resulted from the statutory standing label.
26. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
27. For example, Justice Scalia has noted that one “element of statutory standing is
compliance with [ ] the ‘zone of interests’ test, which seeks to determine whether, apart from
the directness of the injury, the plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be benefitted
by the provision at issue.”  Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 287 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998)
(explicitly connecting the zone of interests test with statutory standing).  See infra Part II.
28. In the words of one scholar, “[t]he Court managed to confuse standing law” with its
initial zone of interests decisions.  Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient
Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 75, 77 (2007), available at http://www.
virginialawreview.org/ inbrief/2007/05/21/cass.pdf.  “Courts have spent thirty-five years trying
to straighten out statutory standing law since then.”  Id. 
standing” performs the function described in Part I.A.  That is, the term refers
merely to the existence of the fact that Congress has granted the private right
of action to a particular plaintiff.  The term does not refer to any legal rule or
set of legal rules.  To the contrary, the legal rules that are implicated are rules
of constitutional standing.  Whether and to what extent Article III
circumscribes Congress’s ability to choose to grant a private right of action to
a large group of persons—that is, to confer broad standing by enacting a
statute with a sweeping private right of action—is a question about the
doctrine of constitutional standing.25
2. Rules for Ascertaining Legislative Intent
A second group of cases associated with “statutory standing” is a line of
Supreme Court decisions involving federal regulatory legislation designed to
protect public rights through private enforcement.  In this long line of cases,
the Court has articulated and applied what is known as the “zone of interests”
test.  This test requires “a plaintiff's grievance [to] arguably fall within the
zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or
constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit.”   It is firmly established as one26
of the prudential standing doctrines, and it also has clear connections to the
requirement of statutory standing.   What is less clear, however, is the precise27
nature of the relationship between the zone of interests test and the
requirement of statutory standing.   It is the contention of this article that the28
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
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29. Pub. L. No. 111-21, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.); see infra Part I.B.2.a (surveying the cases that best support this view).
30. This appears to be the view of Professor Siegel, who authored an important and
exhaustive treatment of the zone of interests test.  Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEO.
L.J. 317, 341-42 (2004) (“[U]ltimately, the question posed by the zone of interests test must be
whether Congress intended the would-be plaintiff in any given case to be able to bring suit
challenging the agency action in question.”).
31. See infra Part I.B.2.b (surveying the cases that best support this view).
zone of interests cases can shed some light on the possible content of a
statutory standing doctrine.  The ultimate lesson to be learned from the zone
of interests cases, however, is that statutory standing should be viewed like any
other element of the cause of action.
One plausible reading of the zone of interests cases is that the test is
merely the Court’s interpretation of the statutory standing rule intended by
Congress in one particular statute: the Administrative Procedure Act (the
APA).   That is, perhaps the zone of interests test is merely a recognition that29
Congress intended plaintiffs suing under the APA to be required to show that
their interests are protected by the statute(s) that they are alleging to have been
violated.   If this reading of the zone of interests cases is correct, then30
statutory standing is a question of legislative intent like any other statutory
prerequisite to recovery.  Thus, to the extent that there is a “doctrine” of
statutory standing, it is comprised of one legal rule—a plaintiff cannot recover
unless that plaintiff is within the class of persons to whom Congress has
granted a private right of action.
An alternative reading of the zone of interests cases, however, is that the test
is a default rule of statutory construction used to assess congressional intent
regarding the class of persons to whom any statutorily-created cause of action
is available.   More specifically, courts will assume that Congress, when31
creating any cause of action, intends the cause of action to extend only to those
plaintiffs who arguably fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute
that the plaintiff is alleging to have been violated.  If this reading of the zone
of interests cases is correct, then there is a special rule of assessing legislative
intent on issues of “statutory standing.”  Even if this is the case, however, the
zone of interests test—and statutory standing by extension—is best understood
as a method to analyze whether Congress intended a particular plaintiff to fall
within the class of persons allowed to recover under a statutorily-created cause
of action. 
Under either view, statutory standing should be viewed as nothing more
than a prerequisite to recovery, like any other element of the statutorily-created
cause of action.
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32. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
33. Id.
34. Id. (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof.”).  There are other “requirements” to sue under section 702: there must be
“agency action,” the agency action must be “final,” and Congress cannot have precluded
judicial review of the particular action that plaintiff is challenging.  Japan Whaling Ass’n v.
Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986).
35. For example, the Department of the Interior is charged with administering a variety of
federal statutes pertaining to the preservation of the national parks.  The APA permits an
individual to file a lawsuit in court if the person believes that the Department of the Interior is
not abiding by the mandates of those federal statutes.  However, the APA makes the cause of
action available only to a person who has been “adversely affected or aggrieved” by the
Department’s failure to follow the federal statutes.  5 U.S.C. § 702.  One perspective on the
zone of interests test is that it merely constitutes an interpretation of the word “aggrieved” in
the APA; that is, in order to be a person “aggrieved” within the meaning of the APA, a person
must be seeking to protect interests that are protected by the statute that the person is contending
has been violated by the administrative agency.  Thus, a person may sue to challenge conduct
of the Interior Department only if the person can show that the person is seeking to vindicate
interests that are within the zone of interests arguably protected by the national park statute that
the person is claiming the Department has failed to follow.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
37. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
38. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
a) An Introduction to the Zone of Interests Test
The judicial review provision of the APA   allows a private person to seek32
judicial review of the conduct of a federal administrative agency.   In33
particular, it provides that a “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action” may seek judicial review of such action.   This judicial review34
provision serves as a gateway to federal court: when a person challenges
agency conduct, the person is often asserting that the agency has failed to
comply with one or more of the substantive federal statutes that the agency is
charged with administering.  Those federal statutes, however, often do not
themselves authorize a private person to seek judicial review of the agency’s
conduct.  It is the judicial review provision of the APA which arguably gives
the plaintiff a private right of action.   But the language of the provision35
confers the cause of action only upon a plaintiff who is a “person . . . adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action.”  36
The zone of interests test was first formulated in two companion cases in
which the plaintiffs relied on the judicial review provision of the APA: Ass’n
of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp  and Barlow v.37
Collins.   In Data Processing, vendors of data processing services invoked the38
judicial review provision of the APA  to sue the Comptroller of Currency and39
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40. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151 (describing the lawsuit).  The plaintiffs argued that
the decision to allow national banks to engage in the business of selling data processing services
violated § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, which provided that “[n]o bank
service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for
banks.”  Id. at 155.
41. Id. at 152.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 153.
44. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 395-96, 400 n.16 (describing the zone of
interests test as a “gloss” on the meaning of the APA).
45. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.  After articulating the zone of interests test, the Court
stated, “Thus, the Administrative Procedure Act grants standing to a person ‘aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of the relevant statute.’”  Id.  Ultimately, the Court concluded
that the plaintiffs, as competitors, did come within the zone of interests protected by § 4 of the
Bank Service Corporation Act, the statute that plaintiffs were claiming to have been violated
by the Comptroller’s decision.  Id. at 156.  As such, the plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit.
Id. (“We do think, however, that § 4 arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests
protected by it.”).
46. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 162 (1970).  The farmers were entitled to receive
subsidy payments under a federal cotton program created by the Food and Agriculture Act of
1965.  The 1965 Act incorporated a relevant provision from another federal statute, the 1938
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act.  At the time the 1965 Act was enacted, the
relevant phrase in the 1938 Act was defined by regulation in a way that would have prohibited
the farmers from assigning their right to the cotton subsidy payments for the purpose of securing
a lease for land.  Id. at 160-61.  Before any cotton subsidy payments were made, however, the
Secretary changed the regulations to allow those payments to be assigned as security for rent.
other defendants to challenge the Comptroller’s decision to allow national
banks to sell data processing services to their customers and to other banks.40
The lower courts dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded.  In explaining why the petitioners had standing,
the Court explained that “[t]he first question is whether the plaintiff alleges
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise.”   The Court held that there was “no doubt” that the petitioners had41
sufficiently alleged injury in fact.   The Court explained, however, that the42
question of standing “concerns, apart from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test, the
question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question.”   Though the Court did not explicitly43
attribute this requirement to the text of the APA (as it would later do),  the44
connection is clear.   45
In Barlow v. Collins, decided the same day as Data Processing, cash-rent
tenant farmers sued the Secretary of Agriculture and other federal and state
officials under the APA to challenge the Secretary’s decision to change
regulations pertaining to the assignment of certain federal benefits.   The46
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Id. at 161-62.  As a result, the plaintiffs’ landlord began to condition leases upon assignment,
and the farmers were deprived of any source of cash or credit to obtain farming supplies.  See
id. at 161-63.  They were left with only the option of obtaining supplies on credit from their
landlord, whose terms were considerably less favorable than those the farmers could have
obtained if they had not been forced to assign their subsidy payments to their landlord.  Id. at
163.
47. Id. at 163-64.
48. Id. at 164.
49. Id. at 164-65.
50. Id. at 165.
51. 400 U.S. 91 (1970) (decided Nov. 23, 1970).
52. 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (decided Apr. 5, 1971).
53. Arnold Tours, 400 U.S. at 45.
54. Inv. Co. Inst., 401 U.S. at 618.  The Court in National Credit Union Administration v.
First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 491 (1998), described the suit in Investment
Company Institute as aimed at stopping national banks from “establish[ing] and operat[ing]
what in essence were early versions of mutual funds.”
55. Arnold Tours, 400 U.S. at 45.
56. Id. at 46.
District Court and Court of Appeals both held that the farmers lacked standing
because “they alleged no invasion of a legally protected interest.”   Again, the47
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, first stating that “there is no doubt that
in the context of this litigation the tenant farmers . . . have the personal stake
and interest that impart the concrete adverseness required by Article III.”48
Next, the Court held that the tenant farmers were “clearly within the zone of
interests” protected by the relevant statutes.  The Court explained that the 1965
and 1938 Acts were both intended to protect the tenant farmers.   Thus, the49
tenant farmers were “persons ‘aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute’ as those words are used in [the APA].”50
The next year, the Court considered two cases with fact patterns similar to
Data Processing.  In both Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp  and Investment51
Company Institute v. Camp,  plaintiffs sued the Comptroller of Currency52
under the APA in order to challenge the validity of the Comptroller’s decision
to allow national banks to engage in a particular type of business—providing
travel services in Arnold Tours  and operating investment funds in Investment53
Company Institute.   In Arnold Tours, the plaintiffs argued that § 4 of the54
Bank Service Corporation Act—the exact statute involved in Data
Processing—prohibited the national banks from engaging in the provision of
travel services.   The Supreme Court held in a short per curiam opinion that55
the plaintiffs had standing, because they were competitors who fell within the
zone of interests protected by § 4.   The Court’s opinion was little more than56
an explanation that competitors generally, not only the data processing
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57. Inv. Co. Inst., 401 U.S. at 619.
58. Id. at 620.
59. Id.
60. Id.  
61. Id. 
62. The zone of interests test is routinely listed as one of the three generally applicable
prudential standing limits.  E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12
(2004); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998); Nat’l Credit Union Admin.
v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 518 (1998) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The
zone-of-interests test is an integral part of the prudential standing inquiry.”); Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (“Numbered among [the] prudential [standing] requirements is the
doctrine of particular concern in this case: that a plaintiff’s grievance must arguably fall within
the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee
invoked in the suit.”). 
competitors, fell within the zone of interests protected by § 4 of the Bank
Service Corporation Act.
In Investment Company Institute, the plaintiffs argued that the Glass-
Steagall Banking Act of 1933 prohibited the national banks from operating
investment funds.   The Court again very briefly rejected the argument that57
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit by stating that such an argument was
“foreclosed” by the Data Processing case.   The Court in Investment58
Company Institute did not even use the term “zone of interests.”  Instead, in
the sole paragraph addressing standing, the Court made three distinct points.
First, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ injury was “indistinguishable” from the
injury to the plaintiffs in Data Processing, so a “case or controversy” existed.59
Next, the Court held that “judicial review of administrative rulings by the
Comptroller as to the legitimate scope of activities available to national banks”
had not been precluded by Congress.   Finally, the Court held “that Congress60
had arguably legislated against the competition that the petitioners sought to
challenge, and from which flowed their injury.”   This last point was an61
oblique reference to the zone of interests test.
Thus, Arnold Tours and Investment Company Institute are easily viewed as
straightforward cases in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed its recently-
announced interpretation of the judicial review provision of the APA.  
b) A Narrow View of the Zone of Interests Test
Though the Court in Data Processing located the zone of interests test
within a standing inquiry, it is not at all clear that the zone of interests test was
intended to be a universally applicable rule of prudential standing.  Moreover,
the actual application of the zone of interests test, in contrast to the way it is
often described,  supports the view that it should be understood as nothing62
more than an interpretation of the APA.  Nearly every case in which the
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63. See Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 522 U.S. 479; Bennett, 520 U.S. 154; Air Courier
Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1990); Clarke v. Secs. Indus.
Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
Even Akins, a case in which the Court cursorily applied the zone of interests test to a cause of
action created directly by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), involved statutory
language that was strikingly similar to that of the APA.  Akins, 524 U.S. at 19-20 (citing 2
U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(a) (2006)) (pointing out that the FECA uses the word “aggrieved” in the
statutory provision that creates the cause of action).  Moreover, it is difficult to read Akins as
standing for the proposition that every statutorily-created cause of action must be subject to the
zone of interests test because the Court’s treatment of the test was extremely brief, and it merely
supported, rather than drove, its conclusion that Congress had authorized the plaintiffs in that
case to assert the statutorily-created cause of action.  But see Bennett, 520 U.S. 154, discussed
infra part I.B.2.b.
64. But see infra Part II.B.2.c.
65. Clarke, 479 U.S. 388.  The fact pattern of Clarke was similar to Data Processing,
Arnold Tours, and Investment Company Institute: in Clarke, a trade association of securities
brokers, underwriters, and investment bankers sued under the APA to challenge the decision
by the Comptroller of the Currency to allow two national banks to offer brokerage
services—services that directly competed with those provided by plaintiff’s members.  Id. at
392 n.2 (describing the suit and Comptroller’s approval of applications by Security Pacific
National Bank of Los Angeles and Union Planters National Bank of Memphis to offer
brokerage services).  The plaintiff in Clarke argued that the Comptroller’s decision violated the
McFadden Act and the Glass-Steagall Act (but only the McFadden Act argument was before
the Supreme Court).  Id. at 392 n.4.  The Court held that the plaintiff had standing because its
competitive injury fell within the zone of interests protected by the McFadden Act.  Id. at 403.
The Court’s conclusion is hardly surprising in light of the prior competitor cases.
66. Id. at 394.
67. Id. at 395-96, 400 n.16.
68. Id. at 396 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
155 (1970)).
Supreme Court has applied the zone of interests test has involved the APA.63
And the Supreme Court has expressed the view that the zone of interests test
is no more than its interpretation of congressional intent in enacting the APA.64
For example, in Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n,  the Court identified the65
question in Data Processing as “basically one of interpreting congressional
intent,” even though it had been “described as one of standing.”   The Court66
stated that the zone of interests test was a “gloss on the meaning”  of the67
judicial review provision of the APA, necessary to limit the availability of the
APA to not only persons suffering an injury in fact, but also those who could
demonstrate compliance with the zone of interests test.68
When the zone of interests test is viewed as merely a rule to interpret the
meaning of the APA, it becomes clear that its label as a prudential standing
doctrine is somewhat misleading.  More importantly, this view of the zone of
interests test permits the conclusion that the term “statutory standing” stands
for nothing more than the straightforward legal rule that a plaintiff must fall
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69. It is worth noting that the zone of interests cases all involve public rights.  In theory,
then, a zone of interests presumption of statutory construction could be limited to only public
rights cases.
70. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).  In that case, plaintiffs sued federal officials for
failing to comply with certain obligations imposed by the Endangered Species Act.  Id.  The
plaintiffs proceeded under the citizen suit provision of the ESA, which permitted “any person”
to sue for violations of the statute.  Id. at 164 n.2 (quoting citizen suit provisions of the ESA).
71. Id. at 162.
72. Id. at 163.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 164.
76. Id. at 166 (“The Court of Appeals therefore erred in concluding that petitioners lacked
standing under the zone of interests test to bring their claims under the ESA’s citizen suit
within the class of persons to whom Congress has granted a cause of action in
order to recover.
c) A Broader View of the Zone of Interests Test
A second view of the relevant cases is that the zone of interests test is a
default presumption of statutory construction.  That is, federal courts will
assume that Congress, when creating a cause of action, intends the claim to
extend only to those plaintiffs who arguably fall within the zone of interests
protected by the statute that the plaintiff is alleging to have been violated.
Congress is free to explicitly reject such a presumption, but in the absence of
such indication, federal courts will apply the presumption to any cause of
action created by Congress.69
This conception of the zone of interests test is most strongly supported by
the Court’s decision in Bennett v. Spear.   In determining whether the70
plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that they were seeking to protect
interests that were arguably within the zone of interests protected by the
Endangered Species Act, the Court acknowledged that the zone of interests test
was “one of the prudential requirements”  of standing and that it had been71
applied to suits in which the plaintiffs were not proceeding under the APA.72
The Court in Bennett stated, however, that “the breadth of the zone of
interests varies according to the provisions of law at issue, so that what comes
within the zone of interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial
review of administrative action under the ‘generous review provisions’ of the
APA may not do so for other purposes.”   That is, “Congress legislates against73
the background of [the zone of interests requirement], which applies unless it
is expressly negated.”   It went on to hold that Congress had “negate[d] the74
zone-of-interests test (or, perhaps more accurately, expanded the zone of
interests)”  in the ESA, such that plaintiffs did not lack standing to sue.75 76
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provision.”).
77. Id. at 164-65.
78. Id. at 166.
79. Id. at 165.
80. An alternative way to describe the Court’s holding is that the ESA arguably protected
a much broader range of interests than the APA, so the “zone” within which plaintiffs had to
locate themselves for purposes of invoking the cause of action created by the ESA was much
bigger than the “zone” for the APA.  See id. at 164 (pointing out that the question of whether
Congress has “negate[d]” the zone of interests test might be more accurately conceived of as
whether Congress has “expand[ed] the zone of interests”).  For purposes of this article, this is
a distinction without a difference.  The point is that the zone of interests test as understood by
its various applications over time did not apply to plaintiffs suing under the ESA because
Congress had indicated the intent to override that particular test.
XXUltimately, the plaintiffs in Bennett v. Spear were not allowed to assert all of their claims
under the ESA, because judicial review had been precluded for some of the claims.  Id. at 171-
74.  But the zone of interests test was not the impediment to their ESA claims.  The Court
clearly held that the plaintiffs were permitted to avail themselves of the cause of action created
by the ESA without demonstrating that they fell within the zone of interests arguably protected
by the statutory provisions that the plaintiffs were claiming to have been violated.  Id. at 164-65.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court pointed to the breadth of the
language used by Congress in creating the cause of action:  Congress
authorized “any person” to “commence a civil suit” in the ESA, which the
Court characterized as “an authorization of remarkable breadth when
compared to the language Congress ordinarily uses.”   The Court also found77
it “even more plausible” that Congress “inten[ded] to permit enforcement by
everyman”  because “the overall subject matter of this legislation is the78
environment (a matter in which it is common to think all persons have an
interest) and [because] the obvious purpose of the particular provision in
question is to encourage enforcement by so-called ‘private attorneys
general.’”   Thus, the Court examined the text of the statute as well as the79
purpose behind it to conclude that Congress did not intend the zone of interests
test to apply to the cause of action created by the ESA.80
If the zone of interests test is intended to serve as a background rule of
statutory construction, which Congress can override, then its identification as
a prudential standing doctrine is somewhat more understandable.  Like the
limit on third party standing, courts will use the test to assume that Congress
intended one result unless it clearly indicates otherwise.  Specifically, courts
will assume that Congress intended to grant a private right of action to only
those plaintiffs within the zone of interests protected by the statute, unless
Congress specifies otherwise.  Even under this view of the zone of interests
test, however, the term statutory standing is best viewed as referring only to
the legal rule that it is necessary to ascertain Congress’s intent in creating a
cause of action, because the plaintiff cannot recover without a finding that he
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81. E.g., Miller v. Rite Aid Corp., 334 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The requirement that the
plaintiff be a plan participant is both a standing and subject matter jurisdictional requirement.”);
Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1464 and n.6 (4th Cir. 1996) (identifying the
question of whether a plaintiff is a fiduciary as a question of standing, which is jurisdictional);
Swinney v. General Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 518 (6th Cir. 1995) (considering for the first
time on appeal the issue of whether plaintiffs qualified as participants within the meaning of
ERISA “because standing is necessary for our exercise of jurisdiction”); Harris v. Provident
Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1994) (identifying the question of whether
plaintiff is a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary as a jurisdictional question); Coleman v.
Champion Intern. Corp./Champion Forest Prods., 992 F.2d 530, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1993)
(identifying the question of whether a plaintiff is a beneficiary as one of standing, which is
jurisdictional and “a ‘threshold question . . . [that] determin[es] the power of the court to
entertain the suit’”); Alexander v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 990 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir.
1993) (raising sua sponte the issue of whether plaintiff is a participant because “[t]he issue of
standing is jurisdictional in nature”).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2006).
83. Id. § 1002(3) (“The term ‘employee benefit plan’ or ‘plan’ means an employee welfare
benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare
or she is within the class of persons for whom Congress intends to make
recovery available.  Thus, even though statutory standing has been linked to
the zone of interests test, and the zone of the interests test has been labeled a
prudential standing doctrine, statutory standing should not be conceived of as
a standing doctrine at all.  Rather, it should be understood as shorthand for the
familiar rule that a plaintiff cannot recover unless the plaintiff is within the
class of persons to whom Congress has conferred a private right of action.
II. Statutory Standing and ERISA
Part I explored one conception of the term statutory standing.  An
examination of lower court opinions, however, reveals another—and more
problematic—conception of the term.  This view is that statutory standing
refers to more than the requirement that the plaintiff must fall within the class
of plaintiffs to whom Congress granted a private right of action in order to
recover.  Many lower courts have embraced this view.  They assume that
statutory standing is a prerequisite not only to recovery, but also to filing.
That is, they assume that statutory standing is, at a minimum, a threshold
requirement, and they often assume that it is a jurisdictional requirement as
well.   Using ERISA as a paradigmatic example, this Part will demonstrate the81
pernicious effects that this understanding of statutory standing can have.
A. ERISA Background
ERISA regulates any “employee benefit plan,”  which is defined as either82
an “employee welfare benefit plan” or “employee pension benefit plan.”83
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benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.”).
84. Id. § 1002(1).
85. Plans providing “vacation benefits,” “training programs,” “day care centers,” or
“prepaid legal services” are also defined as employee welfare benefit plans.  Id. (“The terms
‘employee welfare benefit plan’ and ‘welfare plan’ mean any plan, fund, or program which was
heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is
maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or
benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or
prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than
pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).”).
86. Id. § 1002(2)(A).
87. Id. (“Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the terms ‘employee pension benefit
plan’ and ‘pension plan’ mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or
program-- (i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income
by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of
calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.  A
distribution from a plan, fund, or program shall not be treated as made in a form other than
retirement income or as a distribution prior to termination of covered employment solely
because such distribution is made to an employee who has attained age 62 and who is not
separated from employment at the time of such distribution.”).
88. I use this informal term to refer to the first of the two types of employee benefit plans
identified in ERISA: the “defined benefit plan.”  Id. § 1002(35).
89. A 401(k) plan is an example of the second of the two types of an employee benefit
identified in ERISA: the “defined contribution plan,” also known as an “individual account
plan.”  Id. § 1002(34).
Both of these terms have a fairly wide scope, but their precise definition is not
important for the purposes of this article.  An “employee welfare benefit
plan”  is basically any organized provision of health or disability insurance84
by an employer.   An “employee pension benefit plan”  is basically any85 86
employer-sponsored plan that provides retirement income to its employees.87
There are two common varieties of employer-sponsored retirement benefit
plans.  The first is the traditional pension plan,  in which retirees receive a88
certain, specified amount of money on a regular basis.  They will commonly
receive a check every month; the amount of the check will be the same every
month, and the amount is usually calculated with reference to what the
employee earned when he or she was still working.  The second type of
employer-sponsored retirement benefit plan is exemplified by the now-familiar
401(k) plan.   Such a plan does not promise certain, specified benefits upon89
retirement.  Instead, the employee—and often the employer—makes
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90. ERISA also provides for limited criminal enforcement. Id. § 1111 (punishing the
assumption of the fiduciary role by certain convicted criminals); § 1131 (punishing the willful
violation of ERISA Title I); § 1141 (punishing the coercive interference with ERISA rights).
91. “Section [1132(a)(1)] is the workhorse of ERISA remedy law, the provision under
which routine benefit denial and other ERISA claims proceed.”  John H. Langbein, What ERISA
Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-
West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1334 (2002) (footnotes omitted).  Section 1132(a)(1) creates
a cause of action to recover benefits due under the terms of a plan.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
It also creates a cause of action to recover the statutory penalties provided by ERISA for failure
to comply with various disclosure obligations imposed by the statute.  Id. § 1132(a)(1)(A).
92. Section 1132(a)(2) provides that a “civil action may be brought . . . for appropriate
relief under section 1109 of this title.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).  Section 1109 (often referred
to as ERISA section 409) in turn imposes personal liability upon any fiduciary who breaches
the duties imposed by ERISA.  Id. § 1109.  It requires the fiduciary to “make good to [the] plan
any losses to the plan resulting from” the fiduciary’s breach of duty and “to restore to such plan
any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary . . . .”  Id. § 1109(a).  Thus, § 1109 (and § 1132(a)(2)) provides for direct recovery by
the plan, not the plaintiff who brings suit.  In addition to permitting a court to require the
breaching fiduciary to make the plan whole, section 1109 further provides that the fiduciary
“shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,
including removal of such fiduciary.”  Id.  
93. Section 502(a)(3) provides that a “civil action may be brought . . . (A) to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).  Section
1132(a)(3) has been described as a “‘catchall’ provision,” which “‘act[s] as a safety net, offering
appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that [section 1132] does not
elsewhere adequately remedy.’”  Langbein, supra note 91, at 1334 (footnotes omitted).  The
Supreme Court has taken a conservative approach to § 1132(a)(3), however, dramatically
limiting the relief that it offers to injured individuals.  See generally Paul M. Secunda, Sorry,
contributions over time to the employee’s individual account within the plan;
the plan fiduciaries invest that money, and the employee is permitted
eventually to withdraw funds from his or her individual account, which now
ideally contains more money than was set aside over the course of his or her
time with the employer.
ERISA imposes significant substantive obligations upon the establishment,
maintenance, and administration of these employee benefit plans.  To enforce
these duties, ERISA provides for civil enforcement.   The civil enforcement90
scheme is set forth in section 502 of ERISA, codified in § 1132 of title 29, and
it contemplates both administrative and judicial enforcement.  More
specifically, § 1132(a) creates causes of action that can be asserted in court;
some of the causes of action are available to the government (the Secretary of
Labor and, in one instance, the states), but several causes of action are private
rights of action, available to individuals.  The most significant of these are
located in § 1132(a)(1),  § 1132(a)(2),  and § 1132(a)(3).   Because of an91 92 93
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No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273840 (explaining
the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the remedies available under § 1132(a)(3)). 
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
95. It is presumably also important to be able to identify the Secretary of Labor, to whom
some substantive obligations are owed, but the question is not a difficult one.  The identity of
the Secretary of Labor is, of course, self-evident!
96. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7).  
97. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
98. Id. at 117 (citations omitted).  The Court continued, 
extremely strong ERISA preemption doctrine, the causes of action created by
§ 1132 represent the only way in which individuals can obtain judicial
remedies for violations of ERISA.  And because ERISA has such a wide
scope, the causes of action created in § 1132(a) provide the only means for
individuals to seek redress for most of the wrongs they have suffered in the
context of employer sponsored health care or retirement benefits.
ERISA speaks in terms of “participants,” “beneficiaries,” “fiduciaries,” and
the Secretary of Labor, and § 1132(a) is no exception.  The statutory provision
is entitled, “Persons empowered to bring a cause of action”; it begins with the
following: “A civil action may be brought–” and each subsection then contains
the following language (or its equivalent): “by a participant, beneficiary,
fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor.”   It is therefore important to be able to94
identify whether a person falls into one of those categories.  However, it
cannot be forgotten that whether a person is a “participant,” “beneficiary,”
and/or “fiduciary” has tremendous significance outside of § 1132(a) because
important substantive obligations are imposed upon “fiduciaries,” and the
plans owe substantive obligations to “participants” and “beneficiaries.”95
Not surprisingly, ERISA contains a general definition provision, in which
it defines all three of the relevant terms.  Significantly for the following
discussion, ERISA defines a “participant” as: 
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member
or former member of an employee organization, who is or may
become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee
benefit plan which covers employees of such employer or members
of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to
receive any such benefit.96
The Supreme Court interpreted this language in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company v. Bruch  to mean either (1) “‘employees in, or reasonably expected97
to be in, currently covered employment,’” or (2) “former employees who ‘have
. . . a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment’ or who have
‘a colorable claim’ to vested benefits.”   Thus, the first prong of the definition98
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In order to establish that he or she “may become eligible” for benefits, a claimant
must have a colorable claim that (1) he or she will prevail in a suit for benefits, or
that (2) eligibility requirements will be fulfilled in the future.  This view attributes
conventional meanings to the statutory language since all employees in covered
employment and former employees with a colorable claim to vested benefits “may
become eligible.”  A former employee who has neither a reasonable expectation
of returning to covered employment nor a colorable claim to vested benefits,
however, simply does not fit within the [phrase] “may become eligible.”
Id. at 117-18 (quoting Saladino v. I.L.G.W.U. Nat’l Ret. Fund, 754 F.2d 473, 476 (2d Cir.
1985)).
99. The court in Firestone was not defining “participant” in the context of that word’s
meaning in § 1132.  Rather, the issue in Firestone was whether the plan administrator
(Firestone) owed a substantive obligation to the plaintiffs, former Firestone employees.  More
specifically, the issue was whether Firestone had been required to respond to requests for
information from the plaintiffs.  ERISA provides that a plan administrator must provide certain
information “upon written request of any participant,” 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4), and further
provides that the administrator “may be personally liable to such participant” for failure or
refusal to comply with a request.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B).  The district court had granted
summary judgment for Firestone on the ground that the plaintiffs were not participants when
they requested the information, so Firestone could not be held liable for its failure to respond
to the request.  Firestone, 489 U.S. at 107.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
Firestone was required to respond to the request of any person who claimed to be a participant,
even if that person was not in fact a participant at the time of the request.  Id. at 108.  The
Supreme Court rejected this interpretation as overly expansive, because “Congress did not say
that all ‘claimants’ could receive information about benefit plans.”  Id. at 117.  Rather, only
“participants” were entitled to such information, and “[a] former employee who has neither a
reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment nor a colorable claim to vested
benefits” simply [did] not fit within the definition of that word.  Id. at 118.
100. It is more accurate to say that courts are concerned with the question of whether the
plaintiff qualifies as a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary.  However, there appear to be many
more cases in which the plaintiff is a putative participant, rather than a putative beneficiary or
fiduciary.  Nonetheless, there are statutory standing cases in which the court was focused on
whether the plaintiff qualified as a beneficiary or fiduciary and was thus entitled to bring suit.
101. E.g., Kendall v. Employees Ret. Plan, 561 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2009); Bridges v. Am.
Elec. Power Co., 498 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007); Leuthner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ne.
Pa., 454 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2006).
pertains to current employees and the second prong pertains to former
employees; both categories of employees can qualify as “participants.”99
Seizing on the statutory language in § 1132(a) that extends the causes of
action to participants, as well as the Supreme Court’s definition of that word
in Firestone, lower courts have become consumed with the question of
whether the plaintiff qualifies as a participant and can therefore initiate or
maintain a lawsuit under ERISA.   They have conceived of this issue as a100
statutory standing question.   As a result, they have been unable to101
thoughtfully consider the role that the word “participant” should play in the
different subsections of § 1132(a).
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102. In the ERISA context, the question of “whether the plaintiff falls within the class of
persons to whom Congress has extended the private right of action” turns on whether the
plaintiff qualifies as a “participant” under the statute.  Courts, however, do not usually frame
the question as simply whether the plaintiff “qualifies” as a participant.  See infra Part II.C.
Rather, some courts ask whether the plaintiff “was” a participant at the time of filing the suit,
and some courts ask whether the plaintiff “is” currently a participant; that is, whether the party
is a participant at the time the party is appearing before the court.  Occasionally, a court may
ask whether the plaintiff was a participant at the time the alleged wrongdoing occurred.  This
timing issue is discussed in more detail in Part II.C, infra.
103. E.g., Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1464, n.6 (4th Cir. 1996)
(“Because the issue of standing under ERISA is jurisdictional in nature, we decide it first.”)
104. As one source states,
Courts consistently hold that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over
causes of action brought by plaintiffs who lack [statutory] standing to bring an
ERISA claim.  Courts sometimes express this notion by observing that the
requirement that a private plaintiff be a plan participant or beneficiary is a
requirement of standing as well as subject matter jurisdiction.
JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA LITIGATION 400 (2d ed. 2005) (footnotes and
citations omitted); see also supra note 81.
105. E.g., Graden v. Conexant Sys., Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing
question of whether plaintiff is participant as question of statutory standing, which “is an issue
of subject-matter jurisdiction”); Crawford v. Lamantia, 34 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1994)
(explaining that the question of whether plaintiff is a participant is one of standing, which “goes
to the very power of the court to act . . . .” (quoting Sommers Drug Store Co. Employee Profit
Sharing Trust v. Corregan, 883 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1989)); Sommers, 883 F.2d at 348
(identifying the issue of whether the plaintiff is a participant as one of standing and stating that
“standing is essential to the exercise of jurisdiction . . . .”); see also supra note 81.  
B. The Elevation Problem
One of the harms caused by the careless use of the term “statutory standing”
is that lower courts assume that the question of whether the plaintiff falls
within the class of persons to whom Congress has extended the private right
of action has some special significance.   That is, lower courts often elevate102
the statutory standing question above other questions that should be treated
similarly.  They elevate the question by making it a threshold inquiry, which
means it must be considered first and separate from other questions regarding
whether the plaintiff may ultimately recover.   Some courts not only make103
the statutory standing question a threshold one; they make it jurisdictional.104
It is apparent that lower courts believe that the “doctrine” of statutory
standing impels them to set aside for special treatment the question of whether
the plaintiff qualifies as a participant.   But if courts were to set aside their105
preconceived notions regarding the “doctrine” of statutory standing, it is not
at all clear that the question of whether the plaintiff qualifies as a participant
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106. It is black-letter law that “[t]he failure to prove certain elements of an ERISA cause of
action does not operate to deprive a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction.”  ZANGLEIN &
STABILE, supra note 104, at 395 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1132(a)(2); see supra note 92.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(b).
109. For example, if the plaintiff cannot even colorably claim that he or she qualifies as
either a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, then it may be clear at the outset of the case that
the plaintiff does not fall within the class of persons to whom Congress has granted the causes
is different from any of the other questions implicated by the causes of action
created by § 1132.106
For example, the cause of action created by § 1132(a)(2) provides that a
plaintiff may sue a fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty.   The defendant107
will not be liable if he or she was never a fiduciary of the plan, or if his or her
allegedly wrongful conduct occurred “before he became a fiduciary or after he
ceased to be a fiduciary,” or if the allegedly wrongful conduct does not rise to
the level of a breach of fiduciary duty.108
It would be equally accurate to say that the plaintiff will not recover—which
of course is the same as saying that the defendant will not be liable—if the
defendant was never a fiduciary of the plan, or if the defendant’s allegedly
wrongful conduct occurred before the defendant became a fiduciary or after
the defendant ceased to be a fiduciary, or if the defendant’s allegedly wrongful
conduct does not rise to the level of a breach of fiduciary duty.  That statement
could be rephrased yet again in the following way: Congress did not intend to
grant the cause of action created by § 1132(a)(2) to a plaintiff who was injured
by a defendant who is not a fiduciary of the plan, or by a defendant whose
allegedly wrongful conduct occurred before becoming a fiduciary or after
ceasing to be a fiduciary, or by a defendant whose allegedly wrongful conduct
does not rise to the level of a breach of fiduciary duty.  The different
formulations are simply different articulations of the same basic idea: there are
a variety of conditions to recovery under § 1132(a)(2).
If it is clear at the very outset of the case that the plaintiff cannot satisfy all
of the conditions, then the plaintiff will not be allowed to proceed beyond the
initial pleading stage.  The defendant need only satisfy the burdens of
prevailing on a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c) motion.  If the pleadings do not
make it clear that the plaintiff will fail to satisfy all the relevant conditions of
recovery, but discovery does make such a conclusion apparent, then summary
judgment is available.  That is, the plaintiff will no longer be allowed to
proceed with the § 1132(a)(2) claim.  In other words, the plaintiff will lose.
The issue of whether the plaintiff qualifies as a participant can be treated
identically.  If it is clear at the outset of the case that plaintiff does not qualify
as a participant,  the plaintiff will fail to proceed beyond the initial pleading109
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of action created by § 1132(a).  In such a case, it is unnecessary to reach for any doctrine of
standing, because the plaintiff’s claim will fail on the grounds that he or she is not one of
persons whom Congress intended to be allowed to recover under the statute, and the case can
be dismissed on a motion for failure to state a claim.  In such cases, the defendant will almost
certainly argue that it does not owe any substantive obligation to the plaintiff.
110. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1989) (citations omitted)
(“[T]he term ‘participant’ is naturally read to mean either ‘employees in, or reasonably expected
to be in, currently covered employment,’ or former employees who ‘have . . . a reasonable
expectation of returning to covered employment’ or who have ‘a colorable claim’ to vested
benefits.”).
111. Moreover, if the courts intend to elevate the statutory standing question on account of
its status as a “standing” doctrine, they may need to elevate it in all relevant senses.  For
example, if the question of whether the plaintiff qualifies as a participant is genuinely a question
of “standing,” then at least two curious consequences flow from that determination.  First, the
court will be required to decide the issue, which may entail the adjudication of disputed facts.
Second, because standing is a limitation on only the federal judiciary, the requirement that the
plaintiff qualify as a “participant” would not be one that state courts would have to impose.
Thus, in suits for benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B), where the state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction, the issue of whether the plaintiff is a participant would disappear entirely.  These
stage.  If such a conclusion becomes apparent later in the litigation, summary
judgment is available.  And if the issue of plaintiff’s status remains unclear
(i.e., genuinely disputed), the jury will decide the issue at trial.
There is nothing inherently offensive about a defendant being forced to
litigate a case in which the plaintiff is ultimately unable to prove that he or she
qualifies as a participant.  The situation is identical to one in which the
defendant is forced to litigate a case in which the plaintiff is ultimately unable
to prove that the defendant was a fiduciary or that the defendant breached its
fiduciary duty.  Nor is anything in the participant inquiry logically antecedent
to any of the other questions regarding the plaintiff’s right to recovery.
Indeed, in some instances, the determination of whether the plaintiff qualifies
as a participant turns on whether the plaintiff is capable of satisfying all the
other elements of recovery.  Recall that a participant includes a former
employee who has a “colorable claim that . . . he or she will prevail in a suit
for benefits.”   In such an instance, the issue of whether the plaintiff qualifies110
as a participant turns on whether the plaintiff’s claim in the lawsuit is for
“benefits” and whether that claim is “colorable.”  This means that if the issue
of whether the plaintiff qualifies as a participant is made into a threshold
question, the court will have decide at the outset of the case whether the
plaintiff is suing for something that can be characterized as a “benefit”—an
often complicated question that entails policy judgments about the purpose of
the statute and that may require detailed inquiry into the nature of the
defendant’s wrongdoing.  The court will further have to decide whether the
plaintiff’s claim is colorable, which may also be a laborious inquiry.111
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consequences are not costless.
112. The zone of interest cases are the most likely candidates for the plaintiff to assert a
generalized grievance, because they involve plaintiffs—who are not themselves the direct
subjects of agency action—attempting to force a federal agency to comply with the applicable
law.  In such cases, separation of powers concerns—to the extent that they are valid at all—are
most significant.  But the injury in fact requirement and the prohibition against generalized
grievances screen out all such cases.  Thus, even the zone of interests cases do not involve
plaintiffs who are simply asking the federal agency to follow the law.  Instead, the plaintiffs
have an interest that is adversely affected by the agency action, so the agency’s decision or
conduct inflicts harm on the plaintiff that is distinct from the harm inflicted on every citizen
when the government acts illegally.
113. For similar reasons, it has been argued that even constitutional standing limits should
not apply in cases involving purely private rights.  See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in
Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 277-78 (2008) (arguing that “whatever the
virtue of limiting the judiciary’s role in the vindication of public interests, the restriction on a
litigant’s ability to seek redress in the courts for a violation of a private right is ahistorical and
unjustified.”).
Nor is there a benefit to elevating the statutory standing question to a
threshold question.  Such an inquiry is unnecessary to ensure that the federal
court is adjudicating a particularized dispute in which the plaintiff has a
sufficiently personal stake for the adversarial system to function appropriately.
The constitutional requirement of injury in fact already serves the function of
requiring the plaintiff to have a personal stake in the outcome of the case
because the plaintiff is required to show that he or she has personally suffered
or will imminently suffer a concrete harm, that the defendant’s conduct is the
cause of the harm, and that a favorable outcome in the case is likely to redress
the harm.  Whether the plaintiff qualifies as a “participant” adds nothing to the
plaintiff’s incentive to vigorously litigate the case.
Statutory standing is also unnecessary to ensure that the plaintiff is not
asserting a generalized grievance.  The cases in which statutory standing is
invoked to deny standing do not involve plaintiffs who are asserting harms that
are common to all members of the public.   For example, the ERISA cases112
often entail a plaintiff suing the plan or fiduciaries of the plan for failing to pay
the plaintiff some money that the plaintiff alleges is owed by the terms of the
plan, or for failing to provide information that the plaintiff alleges is owed by
the terms of the plan.  In such cases, separation of powers concerns are entirely
absent; these cases do not raise the specter of a federal judiciary attempting to
oversee another branch of government.  It is, therefore, unnecessary to force
the court to consider as a threshold matter whether the plaintiff qualifies as a
participant.113
Finally, significant consequences follow when courts designate as
jurisdictional the question of whether a plaintiff qualifies as a participant.
Issues that go to the federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction must be raised
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114. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); see
also, e.g., Alexander v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 990 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1993) (raising
sua sponte the issue of whether the plaintiff is a participant because “[t]he issue of standing is
jurisdictional in nature”).
115. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583 (“[S]ubject-matter delineations
must be policed by the courts on their own initiative . . . .”); Mansfield, 111 U.S. at 382.
116. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002); see also,
e.g., Swinney v. General Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 518 (6th Cir. 1995) (considering for the
first time on appeal the issue of whether plaintiffs qualified as “participants” within the meaning
of ERISA “because standing is necessary for our exercise of jurisdiction”); Sommers Drug Store
Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corregan, 883 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting
the argument that defendants have waived a challenge to plaintiffs’ status as participants
because “lack of standing can be raised at any time by a party or by the court.”).
117. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506. 
118. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004); Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111
U.S. 379, 382 (1884); Capron v. Van Noorden, 2 Cranch 126, 127 (1804).
119. E.g., Alexander, 990 F.2d at 538 (raising sua sponte the issue of whether plaintiff is a
participant because “[t]he issue of standing is jurisdictional in nature”).
120. E.g., Swinney, 46 F.3d at 518 (considering for the first time on appeal the issue of
whether plaintiffs qualified as “participants” within the meaning of ERISA “because standing
is necessary for our exercise of jurisdiction”); Sommers, 883 F.2d at 348 (rejecting the argument
that defendants have waived a challenge to plaintiffs’ status as participants because “lack of
standing can be raised at any time by a party or by the court.”).
121. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514.
122. E.g., Harris v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 930, 933-34 (9th Cir. 1994)
(dismissing ERISA claim and accompanying state-law claims  because plaintiff lacked standing
to assert ERISA claim); see also Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514.  Arbaugh seems to hold that the
general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, would not save a § 1132(a) claim if the
sua sponte by the court.   The court is required to always consider the114
question of its own subject-matter jurisdiction, even if the parties have not
raised the issue.   Moreover, a subject-matter jurisdiction challenge is not115
waivable by the parties.   When a question goes to a federal court’s subject116
matter jurisdiction, any litigant can raise the question at any time, even after
the entry of judgment  or on appeal.   Thus, when the lower courts117 118
characterize the issue of whether the plaintiff qualifies as a participant as a
jurisdictional one, they obligate themselves to raise the issue regardless of
whether the parties have done so,  and they authorize the parties to raise the119
issue at any time during the litigation or appellate process.   In addition, if an120
issue is jurisdictional, rather than merely an element of the cause of action,
then—as with standing—the court, rather than a jury, will decide the issue and
may be called upon to resolve disputed facts.   Finally, if the failure of the121
plaintiff to qualify as a participant strips the court of federal question
jurisdiction over the ERISA claim, then the entire complaint must be dismissed
(unless the ERISA claim can rely on some other basis of jurisdiction).   As122
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participant issue were jurisdictional but not satisfied.  Id.; see also ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra
note 104, at 402-03 (“[I]f . . . federal claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
. . . pendent state law claims must be remanded to state court.  This means that it makes a
difference whether a federal court dismisses a case on grounds of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or on alternative grounds.” (citations omitted)).
123. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16.
124. E.g., McBride v. PLM Int’l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that
“standing is measured at the time of filing suit,” but refusing to do so in the particular case
before the court); Raymond v. Mobile Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528, 1534-35 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that plaintiffs’ “standing as participants should be judged as of the time of” filing,
rather than as of the time of the ERISA violation).
the Supreme Court has recognized, these features impose significant costs on
both litigants and courts, so it is advisable to require clear congressional intent
to designate an issue as jurisdictional.123
C. The Obfuscation Problem
Injecting the “doctrine” of statutory standing into the ERISA context also
prevents courts from clearly identifying and resolving issues that pertain to
whether the plaintiff is within the class of persons to whom Congress has
granted the causes of action created by section 1132(a) of ERISA.  For
example, in ERISA litigation, one such issue has led to particular confusion:
when must the plaintiff be a “participant” in order to proceed with the causes
of action created by section 1132(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3).   This article will124
refer to this issue as the “participant timing” issue.
In short, lower courts have failed to see that the participant timing issue is
simply a question of statutory interpretation; specifically, the relevant question
to be answered is whether Congress intended the causes of action in §
1132(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) to be available to (i) any person who is a
participant when the alleged wrongdoing by the defendant occurred, (ii) only
a person who is a participant when the complaint is filed, or (iii) only a person
who is a participant throughout the entire duration of the lawsuit.  A court can
pick one of these three options by examining the text of § 1132(a), as well as
the purpose of the statutory provision.  Unfortunately, courts have not
meaningfully engaged in this relatively straightforward—albeit
challenging—task of statutory interpretation.  Instead, they have allowed the
“doctrine” of statutory standing to drive their understanding of the participant
timing issue.
This can be seen in the way courts analyze cases involving a person who is
no longer actively receiving benefits from a health care or retirement plan.  In
these cases, defendants often argue that such an individual is not allowed to
initiate or continue a suit under § 1132(a), because the person was not a
“participant” when the suit was filed or because the person ceased being a
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125. 34 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1994).
126. Id. at 30-31.  Crawford was technically on an unpaid leave of absence from the
company when he filed the suit, and he resigned almost immediately after filing the suit, but
these facts were irrelevant to the disposition of the case.  Id. at 30.  Crawford is not the most
sympathetic plaintiff of the “cashed out former employee” cases, but his loss is nonetheless
worth scrutinizing for analytic purposes.
127. Id. at 31.
128. Id. at 30-31.
129. Id. at 31.  
130. Id. at 32 (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
131. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1989).
132. The fact that he was on an unpaid leave of absence, see supra note 126, did not alter
this conclusion.
participant at some point during the litigation.  A commonly recurring example
is the “cashed out” former employee—an employee whose employment ends
and then, either immediately upon cessation of employment or at some
subsequent point, receives the remainder of all his or her undisputed retirement
benefits in a lump sum.  When a former employee who has “cashed out”
brings a suit under § 1132(a), or when a former employee “cashes out” after
initiating a suit, lower courts struggle with the question of whether the suit is
viable.
Crawford v. Lamantia  is a representative example of a case in which the125
plaintiff resigned from employment and “cashed out” after initiating a suit
under ERISA.  Peter Crawford was employed by Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL)
when he filed a suit against the trustees of the Employee Stock Ownership
Plan and Trust (ESOP), a type of retirement benefits plan.   He alleged that126
the defendants’ conduct during his employment constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty, remediable under § 1132(a)(2).   After filing the lawsuit,127
however, he resigned from the company and then elected to collect his vested
benefits.   As a result, the defendants brought a motion for summary128
judgment on the grounds that Crawford lacked standing to continue the suit.129
In resolving the motion, the court in Crawford v. Lamantia invoked the
principle that “standing, since it goes to the very power of the court to act,
must exist at all stages of the proceeding, and not merely when the action is
initiated or during an initial appeal.”   The court did not dispute that130
Crawford had been a participant when he filed the suit.  This was unsurprising
in light of the first prong of the Firestone test: a current employee who is
eligible to receive benefits is a participant within the meaning of § 1002(7).131
At the time of the filing the suit, Crawford was a current employee of ADL
who was eligible to receive benefits from the ESOP.   However, the court132
held that it was necessary for Crawford to have standing at the time of the
appeal, so it was insufficient that he had been a participant at the time of filing
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133. Crawford, 34 F.3d at 32 (“Therefore, although plaintiff may have had standing as a
current employee when he brought this action, by the time he filed his amended complaint, he
lost this standing on account of having terminated all vested benefits then due him from the
ESOP.”).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 33.
136. 421 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005).
137. The disputed chiropractic claims were for care received while Mady was covered by
a COBRA plan.  Id. at 99 (explaining that Mady’s job was eliminated in March 2002, she
elected to continue her coverage under the employer-provided health care plan through COBRA
until April 30, 2003, and she received chiropractic care in November 2002).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (describing the complaint).
141. Id. at 100.
the suit.   To determine whether Crawford was a participant at the time of the133
appeal, the court turned to the second prong of Firestone (the “former
employee” prong): Crawford would be a participant if he had a colorable claim
for benefits.   The court rejected Crawford’s argument that he had a colorable134
claim that he would prevail in a suit for benefits because Crawford could not
show that, but for the defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty, he would have
received greater benefits (more money) when he cashed out.135
The problem of what to do with a plaintiff who is no longer actively
receiving benefits under a health care or retirement plan is not limited to
plaintiffs who have elected to collect all of their vested retirement benefits.  In
the health care context, termination of employment will result in lack of
coverage.  In Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc.,  Doris Mady sued her136
health plan and an affiliated company for benefits that she alleged should have
been provided when she was still covered by the plan.  Mady received
chiropractic care while she was covered by employer-provided health care.137
The chiropractic care had been covered in the past,  but the health plan began138
to deny coverage after hiring a new company to review claims.  Mady alleged
that she attempted to utilize the health plan’s procedures to request additional
information about the denial of coverage, but she was unable to ever contact
the health plan or the claim review company.   As a result, Mady (and139
another member of the health plan, Alexis Nechis) sued the health plan,
alleging that it had violated ERISA by failing to disclose new criteria for
reviewing chiropractic claims, failing to reveal that the company reviewing
those claims was receiving financial incentives for denying such claims, failing
to provide benefits due under the health insurance plan, and failing to fulfill
its fiduciary duty.   Mady and Nechis proceeded under § 1132(a)(3),  and140 141
the complaint was filed after Mady’s COBRA coverage had been
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142. Id. at 99 (“On September 22, 2003, the plaintiffs brought this action against Oxford and
Triad on behalf of themselves and similarly situated participants.”).
143. Id.  Defendants brought a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).  FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b).
144. Nechis, 421 F.3d at 101 (holding that Mady was not a participant “when her complaint
was filed”).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1989).
148. See, e.g., 34 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1994). 
149. E.g., id.
terminated.   Defendants brought a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that142
Mady was not permitted to initiate a lawsuit under § 1132(a).  143
In resolving the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court in Nechis focused
on whether Mady was a participant when she filed the suit.  It ultimately held
that Mady lacked standing because she was not a participant at the time of
filing.   The court explained that Mady was not a participant because her144
COBRA coverage had been terminated by the time she filed the complaint.145
Nor could she demonstrate that she would have any future eligibility for
benefits because she had been terminated as part of downsizing.   The court146
did not consider whether Mady might have been able to satisfy the second
prong of Firestone because her suit sought reimbursement for benefits that she
should have been provided when she was covered and hence constituted a
“colorable claim for vested benefits.”147
The opinions in Crawford and Nechis are problematic not necessarily for
the results they reach, but rather because of the reasoning employed by the
courts.  A court might reasonably conclude, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that a plaintiff must be a participant at every stage of the
lawsuit, or only at the time of filing, or only at the time of the alleged
wrongdoing.  That is, there are at least three reasonable conclusions regarding
the participant timing issue.  But the concept of standing has interfered with
the lower courts’ ability to take a sufficiently thoughtful and thorough
approach in analyzing that question.  Some courts, like the court in Crawford
v. Lamantia, insist that standing must exist at every stage of the lawsuit.148
They arrive at this conclusion because they identify the question of the
plaintiff’s status as a participant as a question of statutory standing, and they
invoke the rule that standing must exist at every stage of the lawsuit.   For149
these courts, a plaintiff who cashes out of a retirement plan during a lawsuit
will lose the ability to pursue the suit.  And a plaintiff who has cashed out
before initiating the suit will be immediately thrown out of court.
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150. E.g., Miller v. Rite-Aid Corp., 504 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We have
repeatedly held that whether a living party is a ‘participant’ or ‘beneficiary’ is determined as
of the time the lawsuit is filed.”); Nechis, 421 F.3d at 101.
151. Mootness is often described as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: [t]he
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must
continue throughout its existence (mootness).”  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189-90 (2000).  The Court in Laidlaw clarified that “the description of
mootness as ‘standing set in a time frame’ is not comprehensive,” id. at 190, but the Court’s
opinion should not be read to mean that a plaintiff who ceases to be able to satisfy standing
requirements should be permitted to continue with his or her lawsuit.
These courts may invoke the second prong of Firestone to permit certain
plaintiffs to sue and thus to avoid apparently harsh results in some instances,
but that approach generates its own difficulties.  The second prong of
Firestone forces courts to scrutinize whether the claim is genuinely one “for
benefits.”  Because courts have to determine whether the plaintiff’s lawsuit is
seeking “benefits,” they may be forced to deny standing to plaintiffs who
appear to be seeking something that cannot easily be characterized as the
benefits they should have received earlier.  This may be unobjectionable, but
courts frequently struggle with the question of whether a claim is “for
benefits”; the answer is not an obvious one.  Moreover, the second prong of
Firestone forces the court to consider the merits of the case as part of the
standing inquiry: the court must confirm that the plaintiff’s claim is
“colorable” before it can conclude that the plaintiff is a participant.
Other courts, like the court in Nechis, only require the plaintiff to be a
participant at the time of filing the lawsuit.   Some may believe that this is the150
best interpretation of § 1132(a) from a strictly textualist approach.  This is not
to say that it is the interpretation of § 1132 that courts should adopt, because
an alternative interpretation may be more appropriate in light of the purpose
of ERISA.  However, the “participant at the time of filing” rule would be
difficult to criticize as entirely unreasonable.  Unfortunately, courts that adopt
this interpretation also speak in terms of standing.  It is unfortunate because it
is incongruous to require standing to exist only at the time of filing the lawsuit;
standing should exist at every stage of the lawsuit.  If a plaintiff ceases to be
able to satisfy one of the requirements of standing, it is common to conclude
that the case is moot.   It is arguably an end-run around the ordinary151
conception of standing to conclude that a plaintiff has standing by virtue of the
fact that he or she satisfied the conditions of standing at the time of filing the
suit but could no longer satisfy those conditions if the suit were initiated later.
More importantly, couching the rule in terms of standing prevents a more
elegant and doctrinally sound approach to the problem.  A court could explain
that the text of § 1132(a) demonstrates that Congress intended the cause of
action to be available to only those plaintiffs who are participants at the time
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of filing the suit, and ceasing to be a participant during the pendency of the
suit does not take the plaintiff out of the class of persons to whom Congress
intended to grant the private right of action.  Such a requirement is like any
other element of the cause of the action, which may be satisfied by the
existence of certain facts in the past.  For example, the requirement that the
defendant was a fiduciary at the time of the alleged wrongdoing  focuses only152
on the defendant’s status at a certain time in the past, and it is of no moment
if the defendant is no longer a fiduciary at the time of the lawsuit.  Similarly,
there is nothing facially problematic about the conclusion that one of the
elements of the cause of action is that the plaintiff is a participant at the time
of filing the suit.  Moreover, when the conclusion is framed in this way, rather
than in terms of standing, it is sound as a matter of legal reasoning and should
not suffer the impediment to acceptance that a strained application of standing
may create.
Moreover, framing the issue of participant status at the time of filing as an
element of the cause of action leaves room for courts to conclude that the
element is jurisdictional.  As discussed in Part II.B, courts should be wary of
reaching such a conclusion, and it should be justified solely as a matter of
statutory interpretation, not “standing.”  A court may conduct a rigorous
analysis, however, and conclude that Congress’s intent was to make the
plaintiff’s status as a participant at the time of filing the suit a jurisdictional
issue.  Subsequent events do not divest the court of subject-matter jurisdiction,
so if the plaintiff is a participant when the suit is filed (and other jurisdictional
elements are satisfied), then the court has subject-matter jurisdiction and any
change in the plaintiff’s status will not strip the court of jurisdiction any more
than a plaintiff’s change in citizenship after filing the complaint would divest
the court of diversity jurisdiction over the suit.
Thus, courts that rely on “standing” to analyze the participant timing issue
fail to meaningfully grapple with the question of statutory interpretation with
which they should be concerned.  The best reading of § 1132(a) is arguably
one in which the plaintiff is required only to have been a participant at the time
of the alleged wrongdoing by the defendant.  This is not to say that all lower
courts fail to reach this conclusion.  Graden v. Conexant Systems, Inc.  is an153
example of a case in which a “cashed out” former employee initiated a suit
under ERISA, thereby prompting defendants to file a motion to dismiss for
lack of standing.  In that case, Howard Graden was an employee of Conexant
until 2002 and enrolled in a Conexant 401(k) plan until October 2004.154
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
122 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:89
155. Id.
156. Id. at 294 n.1.
157. Id. at 294.
158. Graden v. Conexant Sys., Inc., No. 05-0695, 2006 WL 1098233, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 31,
2006).  The defendants brought a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).  Id.
159. Graden, 496 F.3d at 296 n.7.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 294.
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Graden had elected to invest all of his retirement funds in company stock.
Unfortunately, the stock started to drop precipitously in value in March 2004,
and Graden “cashed out”—elected to take his money out of the Conexant
401(k) plan—in October 2004.   He subsequently sued Conexant, its officers,155
and individual members of the committee that administered the Conexant
plan  for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(2), alleging that Conexant156
should not have offered company stock as an investment option in the first
place and that Conexant had fraudulently induced him to invest his money in
company stock.   The defendants argued that Graden should not be allowed157
to initiate the suit because he no longer had funds invested in the Conexant
plan.   The court expressly noted that it may have been sufficient for Graden158
to have been a participant at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.   (It did not159
so hold because Graden did not rely on that argument. )  Unfortunately, the160
court in Graden also spoke in terms of standing—it framed the question as
“when statutory standing must attach”  and stated that “statutory standing is161
an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.”   As a result, the court’s recognition162
that a plaintiff need only prove that he or she was a participant within the
meaning of ERISA at the time of the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing is
unlikely to be persuasive, because other courts will seize on the label of
“standing” and then insist that a plaintiff must have standing either at the time
of the filing or throughout the entire lawsuit.  If the Third Circuit were to
abandon the standing framework entirely, it could conclude that Congress
intended to permit suit by any plaintiff who was a participant at the time of the
defendant’s alleged violation of ERISA.  Unfortunately, such an abandonment
of the standing framework has not occurred.  Even the most insightful opinion
about the analytic weaknesses that are currently plaguing lower courts dealing
with the participant timing issue (and others)—that of the Seventh Circuit in
Harzewski v. Guidant Corporation —holds onto the concept of standing.  In163
so doing, it perpetuates the basic problems in this area.
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Conclusion
This article focuses attention on the term “statutory standing” to provide a
framework for understanding the different ways in which the term is used and
to urge that one meaning of the term, commonly employed by the lower
courts, be abandoned.  “Statutory standing” may innocuously be used as
shorthand for the question of whether Congress has chosen to make a cause of
action available to a particular plaintiff or class of plaintiffs.  It can also be
used harmlessly as shorthand for the answer to that question; that is, the term
can be used to describe the fact of Congress having made a private right of
action available to a particular plaintiff or class of plaintiffs.  When the term
statutory standing is used to describe more than the particular question
identified above or the answer to that question, however, the negative effects
of that label necessarily outweigh its benefits.
Statutory standing could be used to refer to the uncontroversial legal rule
that a plaintiff must fall within the class of plaintiffs to whom Congress has
made the cause of action available in order to recover.  Used in such a way, the
term can continue to serve as useful shorthand.  It is not as useful as it might
be, however, because there are many requirements for the plaintiff to recover.
And it can be difficult to identify which of them should fall within the
category of statutory standing.  Nonetheless, the term may serve a purpose.
Unfortunately, the term is too often used by lower courts to refer to a set of
legal rules that are not justified by either history or policy.  In particular, the
term “statutory standing” in many courts has come to mean not only that the
plaintiff must fall within the class of persons to whom Congress granted the
private right of action in order to recover, but also that such a requirement is
a threshold question, to be treated separately from the merits of the case and,
in some instances, also as a jurisdictional question.  Such a view of statutory
standing should be rejected as unsound and unwise. 
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